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Abstract
A block cipher can be easily broken if its encryption functions can be
seen as linear maps on a small vector space. Even more so, if its round
functions can be seen as linear maps on a small vector space. We show that
this cannot happen for the AES. More precisely, we prove that if the AES
round transformations can be embedded into a linear cipher acting on a
vector space, then this space is huge-dimensional and so this embedding
is infeasible in practice. We present two elementary proofs.
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1 Introduction
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [10] is nowadays the most widespread block
cipher in commercial applications. It represents the state-of-the-art in block cipher
design and the only known attack on its full version is the biclique attack [4], which still
requires an amount of cryptanalytic effort slightly less than the brute-force key-search.
Practical attacks on reduced versions of the AES only tackle up to 6 rounds, with
the Partial Sum attack being the most dangerous [8, 1] The best that a designer can
hope for a block cipher is that all its encryption functions behave in an unpredictable
way (close to random), in particular the designer aims at a cipher behaviour totally
different from linear or affine maps.
An indication of the cryptographic strength of the AES is that nobody has been able to
show that its encryption functions are any closer to linear maps than arbitrary random
functions. However, it might be possible to extend the AES to act on larger spaces,
in such a way that the possible non-random behaviour of the AES becomes easier to
spot. Generally speaking, the worst scenario for a designer consists of a space large
enough to make the AES linear but small enough to allow practical computations.
In this note we prove in two elementary ways, respectively using counting argu-
ments (Section 3) and number theory arguments (Section 4), that the round functions
of the AES cipher cannot be embedded into a linear group acting on a vector space
W , unless the dimension of W is huge, making this embedding useless in practice.
Both proofs show that the smallest degree of a (faithful) representation of the group
generated by the round functions of the AES, that is Alt((F2)
128) [12], is at least 267.
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Since computing a 267× 267 matrix is infeasible in practice, our result shows that this
attack cannot be mounted in practice.
In 1976 Wagner [14] studied the (faithful) linear representations of Alt((F2)
128)
and was already able to prove that their minimal degree is 2128. Therefore, we do
not claim any new algebraic result in this note. The interest of our note lies in three
facts. First, we provide elementary proofs of our degree estimate, lacking a deep
algebraic background, while Wagner’s proof follows an involved argument relying on
representation theory. Second, we show the link between a purely group theory result
and a possible practical application in cryptanalysis, providing thus more assurance
in the cipher itself (since the attack cannot be practically mounted). Third, our two
proofs are based on utterly different arguments, one counting the number of group
elements and the other estimating the maximal element order, but do lead to the
same numerical estimate, which we find unexpected and deserves noting.
This note is part of the PhD thesis of the second author [11], which was never
before published in a peer-reviewed journal.
2 Preliminaries
Let n ≥ 2 be an integer. Let F = F2 be the field with 2 elements. Let V = Fn be the
vector space over F of dimension n. We denote by Sym(V ) and Alt(V ), respectively,
the symmetric and alternating group on V . We denote by GL(V ) the group of all
linear permutations of V .
Let C be any block cipher such that the plaintext space M coincides with the
ciphertext space. Let K be the key space. Any key k ∈ K induces a permutation τk
on M. Since M is usually V = Fn for some n ∈ N, we can view τk as an element of
Sym(V ). We denote by Γ = Γ(C) the subgroup of Sym(V ) generated by all the τk’s.
Unfortunately, the knowledge of Γ(C) is out of reach for the most important block
ciphers, such as the AES [10] and the DES [9]. However, researchers have been able
to compute another related group. Suppose that C is the composition of l rounds (the
division into rounds is provided in the document describing the cipher). Then any key
k would induce l permutations, τk,1, . . . , τk,l, whose composition is τk. For any round
h, we can consider Γh(C) as the subgroup of Sym(V ) generated by the τk,h’s (with k
varying in K). We can thus define the group Γ∞ = Γ∞(C) as the subgroup of Sym(V )
generated by all the Γh’s. Obviously, Γ ≤ Γ∞ . The group Γ∞ is traditionally called
the group generated by the round functions with independent sub-keys. This group is
known for some important ciphers, for the AES we have
Proposition 1 ([12]).
Γ∞(AES) = Alt(F
128).
Remark 1. The fact that Γ∞ is the alternating group is not an exception holding only
for the AES. Indeed, any block cipher built choosing accurately the cipher components
(SBoxes and linear mixing layer) will have Γ∞ as either the alternating group or the
symmetric group, even if the cipher is defined over a positive characteristic (see [5, 2]).
Given a finite group G, we say that G can be linearized if there is an injective
morphism π : G → GL(W ), for some vector space W (this is called a “faithful rep-
resentation” in representation theory). If G can be linearized, then, for any element
g ∈ G, an attacker can compute a matrix Mg corresponding to the action of g over
W (via π). If the dimension of W is sufficiently small, the matrix computation is
straightforward, since it is enough to evaluate g on a basis of W . In cryptanalysis,
this attack would be called a chosen-plaintext attack and can easily be translated into
a known-plaintext attack by collecting enough random plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
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In this note we show that it is impossible to view Γ∞(AES) as a subgroup of GL(W )
with W of small dimension. In Cryptography it is customary to present estimates as
powers of two, so our problem becomes to find the smallest m such that Γ∞(AES) can
be linearized in GL(F2
m
).
There are two elementary ways to show that a finite group H cannot be contained
(as isomorphic image) in a finite group G. The first is to show that |H | > |G|, the
second is to show that there is η ∈ H such that its order is strictly larger than the
maximum element order in G. In Section 3 we present our result using the first
approach and we show that m ≥ 67. In Section 4 we present our result using the
second approach and we show again that m ≥ 67.
3 Counting the group size
In this section we show that the order of Alt(F128) is strictly larger than the order of
GL(F2
66
), so that if Alt(F128) < GL(F2
m
) then m ≥ 67.
First we recall some well-known formulae: if V = Fn,
|Sym(V )| = 2n!, |Alt(V )| = 2
n!
2
|GL(V )| =
n−1∏
h=0
(2n − 2h) < 2n2 .
We begin with showing a lemma.
Lemma 1. The following inequality holds
2(2
7)19 < 2128! < 2(2
7)20 .
Proof. Let n = 27, we have to show 2n
19
< 2n! < 2n
20
.
We first show that 2n
19
< 2n! .
Note that the following inequality
1
2n−i
≥ 1
2n−i+1 − h (1)
holds for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 2 and 1 ≤ h ≤ 2n−i.
Clearly
2n! > 2n
19 ⇐⇒ 2n(2n − 1)! > 2n · 2n19−n
⇐⇒ (2n − 1)(2n − 2)! > 2n19−n · 2
n − 1
2n − 1 .
We apply (1) with i = 1 and h = 1 and so we must prove
(2n − 1)(2n − 2)! > 2n19−n · 2
n − 1
2n−1
,
i.e.
(2n − 2)! > 2n19−n−(n−1). (2)
In a similar way for i = 1 and h = 2, from (2) we obtain
(2n − 2)(2n − 3)! > 2n19−n−(n−1) · 2
n − 2
2n−1
,
hence
2n! > 2n
19 ⇐⇒ (2n − 3)! > 2n19−n−2(n−1),
and so on for all 3 ≤ h ≤ 2n−1 we obtain that we must verify
(2n−1 − 1)! > 2n19−n−2n−1(n−1).
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Then we proceed by applying (1) for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n − 2 and all 1 ≤ h ≤ 2n−i, so that
we need only to prove
(2n−(n−1) − 1)! ≥ 2n19−n−
∑n−1
i=1
2n−i(n−i) .
In other words, we have to prove
1 > 2n
19−n−
∑n−1
i=1
2n−i(n−i), that is, 0 > n19 − n−
n−1∑
i=1
2n−i(n− i). (3)
But a direct check shows that the right-hand size of (3) holds when n = 27.
We are left with proving the following inequality: 2n! < 2n
20
.
We proceed by induction for 2 ≤ n ≤ 27. In this range a computer computation shows
that
n20 + 2nn+ 2n < (n+ 1)20. (4)
When n = 2, we have 22! < 22
20
.
Suppose that 2n! < 2n
20
and n ≤ 27. We have to prove that 2(n+1)! < 2(n+1)20 . Since
2n+1! = (2n · 2)! = 2n!(2n+1) · · · (2n+2n) and since 2n+ j ≤ 2n+1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n,
we have
2n!(2n+1) · · · (2n+2n) < 2n20+n+1·(2n+2) · · · (2n+2n) ≤ 2n20+2n(n+1) = 2n20+2nn+2n
and, applying (4), we get 2n
20+2nn+2n < 2(n+1)
20
. Then the claimed inequality 2n+1! <
2(n+1)
20
follows.
Our result is contained in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Let W = F2
m
with m ≥ 2. If G < GL(W ), with G isomorphic to
Alt(F128), then m ≥ 67.
Proof. If G < GL(W ), then |G| ≤ |GL(W )|. But |Sym(F128)| = 2128! > 22133 thanks
to Lemma 1 and so
|G| = |Alt(F128)| = |Sym(2
128)|
2
>
22
133
2
= 22
133−1 > 22
132
= 2(2
66)2 > |GL(F266)| .
Remark 2. We could improve the previous bound to l ≥ 68 by using the finite version
of the Stirling formula:
n log2(n) − n log2(e) ≤ log2(n!) ≤ n log2(n)− n log2(e) + log2(n),
or equivalently (n
e
)n
≤ n! ≤ n
(n
e
)n
. (5)
However, our proof involves only elementary combinatorial arguments, which are not
enough to prove (5), since the latter requires some non-algebraic arguments, such as
mathematical analysis.
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4 Computing the maximum order of elements
In this section we compare the maximum order of elements in the two groups Alt(F128)
and GL(F2
m
). We use permutations of even order. We denote by o(σ) the order of
any permutation σ.
We need the following two theorems.
Theorem 1 ([6]). Let σ ∈ GL(FN), with o(σ) even and N ≥ 4. Then
o(σ) ≤ 2(2N−2 − 1) = 2N−1 − 2.
Moreover, there is σ ∈ GL(FN) whose order attains the upper bound.
Proof. It follows directly from Theorem 1 in [6], with p = q = 2 and N ≥ 4 (so point
(a) and (b) do not apply).
Theorem 2 (Theorem 5.1.A at p. 145 in [7]). Let ν ≥ 3 and n = 2ν . Then Alt(Fν)
contains an element η of order (strictly) greater than e
√
(1/4)n lnn).
In order to be able to compare the two estimates coming from Theorem 1 and
Theorem 2, we rewrite Theorem 2 as follows, in order to have o(σ) even. Our proof is
an easy adaption of the proof contained in [7].
Theorem 3. Let ν ≥ 7 and n = 2ν . Then Alt(Fν) contains an element η with
o(η) > e
√
(1/4)n lnn) and o(η) even.
Proof. Let z be a prime number such that 4 +
∑
3≤p≤z p ≤ n, where the sum runs
over distinct prime numbers from 3 to z. Then Alt(Fν) contains an element ηz whose
non-trivial cycles are two transpositions and some cycles with length 3, . . . , z. Hence
o(ηz) = 2
∏
3≤p≤z p.
If we show that there is a prime number z such that
4 +
∑
3≤p≤z
p ≤ n and ln(o(ηz))2 > 1
4
n ln(n),
we have done.
Let θ(z) = ln(o(ηz)) = ln(2) +
∑
3≤p≤z ln(p) and let us denote θ
∗(z) = θ(z)− ln(2) =∑
3≤p≤z ln(p).
Let f(z) = z
ln(z)
. Since f(z) is an increasing function for real z > e, in the case when z
is a real number and z ≥ 19 (for z = 19 note that 4+∑2<p≤19 p = 79 < 128 = 27 ≤ n),
we have that
f(4) ln(4) + f(3) ln(3) = 7 < f(19) ln(3) ≤ f(z) ln(3).
So, if z ≥ 19 and z ∈ R, we can write
4 +
∑
2<p≤z
p = f(4) ln(4) +
∑
2<p≤z
f(p) ln(p)
= f(4) ln(4) + f(3) ln(3) +
∑
3<p≤z
f(p) ln(p)
< f(z) ln(3) +
∑
3<p≤z
f(z) ln(p)
=
∑
2<p≤z
f(z) ln(p) = f(z)
∑
2<p≤z
ln(p) = f(z)θ∗(z).
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We shall choose z¯ ≥ 19 such that f(z¯)θ∗(z¯) = n. Such a z¯ exists because f(19)θ∗(19) <
100 < n and f(z)θ∗(z) is an increasing function assuming all values.
Since θ∗(z¯) > z¯/2 for z¯ ≥ 19, we have
n = f(z¯)θ∗(z¯) =
z¯θ∗(z¯)
ln(z¯)
<
2(θ∗(z¯))2
ln(2θ∗(z¯))
=
4(θ∗(z¯))2
2 ln(2θ∗(z¯))
= f(4(θ∗(z¯))2).
However we also have f(n ln(n)) < n. Since f is an increasing function, this shows
that n ln(n) < 4(θ∗(z¯))2 < 4(θ(z¯))2. It is now enough to consider z˜ as the largest
prime smaller than z¯.
Now, we compare the estimates from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Take n = 2128
and η ∈ Alt(F128) such that o(η) ≥ et (o(η) even), where t =
√
(1/4)n ln(n) =√
(1/4)2128 ln(2128). Since
et = e
√
2126128 ln(2) = e
√
2133 ln(2) = (e
√
2 ln(2))2
66
,
by replacing e with 2log2(e), we obtain
et = (2log2(e)
√
2 ln(2))2
66
= 22
66 log2(e)
√
2 ln(2) = 22
66ǫ,
where ǫ ∈ R is about 1.7. According to Theorem 3, o(η) ≥ e266ǫ. If Alt(F128) ⊂
GL(FN), we then need the the smallest N such that o(η) ≤ (2N−1 − 2) (Theorem 1).
In other words we have to see when the following inequality holds
o(η) = e2
66ǫ ≤ (2N−1 − 2). (6)
We observe that
• if N = 266, then (6) is false, since 2266ǫ > 2266 > 2266−1 − 2;
• if N = 267, then (6) is true, since 2266ǫ < 2266(1.7) < 2267−1 − 2.
Therefore, we need at least m ≥ 67 to embed Alt(F128) ⊂ GL(F2m ), which is exactly
the same value as in Proposition 2.
5 Conclusion
In this note we provided two elementary proofs, lacking a deep algebraic background,
that the round functions of the AES cipher cannot be embedded into a linear group
acting on a vector spaceW , unless the dimension ofW is at least 267. Since computing
a 267 × 267 matrix is infeasible in practice, our result shows that this attack cannot
be mounted in practice. Moreover, since we do not use the specific structure of the
AES in our proof of Proposition 2, we note that such result could be used also for any
other block cipher C acting on 128−bit messages such that the group generated by its
round functions is Alt(F128), e.g. SERPENT [15], or Sym(F128).
Moreover we observe that for any block cipher C acting on 64−bit messages such that
Γ∞(C) = Alt(F64) (e.g. KASUMI [13] and a special extension of GOST [3]) with a
similar argument of Lemma 1 we obtain
(26)11 < 264! < (26)13.
Hence
|Alt(F64)| = |Sym(2
64)|
2
>
22
66
2
= 22
66−1 > 22
64
= 2(2
32)2 > |GL(F232)|
and so if Alt(F64) < GL(F2
m
), then m ≥ 33. Also in this case, we can conclude that
the embedding of GOST and KASUMI in a linear cipher is infeasible in practice.
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Finally we note that the infeasibility of this type of linearization of a block cipher
provides an additional motivation to check the size of the group generated by the
round functions of a block cipher. In particular, it is important to check the optimal
case when this group is the alternating or the symmetric group.
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